2. Where by a clause in the lease it was provided that in the event the tenant shall violate or omit to perform any of the covenants or conditions thereof, “ the landlord * * * may re-enter the same either by force or otherwise * * * and may either elect to terminate this lease or term or may relet the said premises at any time as the agent of the tenant,” the word “ re-enter,” as used, should be given its natural rather than its common-law meaning and thus survives dispossess proceedings whereby the grantee was enabled to take possession of the premises. And it being the agreement of the parties that the landlord may relet “ at any time,” unless it appears that he has by some affirmative act terminated the lease, he may keep it alive for its entire term for the purpose of reletting. An action to recover the security is prematurely brought, therefore, where nothing in the record justifies the conclusion that the option to relet has been extinguished or abandoned. (Anzolone v. Paskusz, 96 App. Div. 188, approved.)
Rosenfeld v. Aaron, 223 App. Div. 710, reversed.
(Argued June 18, 1928;
decided July 19, 1928.)
Appeal, by permission, from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered February 27, 1928, unanimously affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict directed by the court.
Joseph J. Schwartz for Hyman Aaron, appellant.