As noted this statute relates only to a wrongful withholding of a security deposit after the termination of a tenancy. It supplants, then, the statutory remedy in damages for the wrongful withholding of a deposit of twice the amount of a deposit, in lieu of the former action in conversion (and punitive damages) accruing at that time, not before. Appellants cite the case of State ex rel. Tiller v. Bacon, 637 S.W.2d 443 (Mo.App.1982), where Tiller alleged that in leasing premises, she deposited a security deposit which was to be returned to her at the termination of the lease if she did not violate its terms; that she did not violate the lease terms but was constructively evicted from the premises by the landlords. The court held that prohibition did lie to prevent the striking of Tiller’s allegations, which were ordered reinstated for trial thereon. Because of enactment of the statute replacing the action of conversion for one of statutory remedy of an action for recovery of a security deposit with double damages, where a tenancy has arisen the Tiller case is no longer viable. That does not mean, however, under the facts here, as a jury could determine, that a conversion occurred when respondent declined to return appellants’ security deposit before any possession or occupancy was given, before any rent was due and when there could not be damage to the premises which they had never occupied, and thus no “tenancy” ever arose under the above definitions. See DeLong v. Osage Valley Elec. Co-op. Ass’n, 716 S.W.2d 320, 323[4] (Mo.App.1986), where it is said, “Conversion may be proved in one of three ways; (1) by tortious taking; (2) by any use or appropriation to use by the person in possession indicating a claim of right in opposition to the owner’s rights; or (3) by refusal to give up possession to the owner on demand. (Citations omitted.)” The statute is therefore no bar to appellants’ action because the statute, if in derogation of the common law, must be construed strictly, Watkins v. Wattle, 558 S.W.2d 705, 711 (Mo.App.1977); Huff v. Union Elec. Co., 598 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Mo.App.1980), involved the question of whether Union Electric was an owner of premises upon which improvements were erected by independent contractors which would cause it to be excepted as a statutory employee under worker’s compensation laws. The court said, “The issue is the common law liability of respondent, and the law must be strictly construed when existing common law rights are affected. Harryman v. L & N Buick-Pontiac, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. banc 1968). * * * If there is a close question, as there is here, the decision should be weighted in favor of retention of the common law right of action.” If the legislature intended to abrogate the remedy of conversion in this situation, its purpose must be clearly and plainly expressed, 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 61.01. Such a purpose is not here clearly and plainly expressed as to appellants’ claim at the outset of their rela*709tion with respondent, which was before any tenancy arose.