District of Columbia v. Towers (2021)

Citation: District of Columbia v. Towers (2021)
Parent Document: District of Columbia v. Towers (2021)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 2021-05-13
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4882760/district-of-columbia-v-towers/ ↗

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to have his or her possession interfered with except by lawful process, and violation
of that right gives rise to a cause of action in tort.”).
      16
         Cf. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 12 n.6 (1988) (“States have
broad power to regulate housing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant
relationship in particular . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hornstein v.
Barry, 560 A.2d 530, 533–34 (D.C. 1989) (en banc) (“Laws adjusting the burdens
and benefits of economic life come to the courts with a presumption of
constitutionality . . . .”).
      17
          Of course, a property owner’s hands are not completely tied by the statutory
scheme limiting their ability to go to court to recoup their rent or reclaim their
property from a tenant. They may always attempt to negotiate with the tenant
directly. Cf. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973) (explaining that
“bankruptcy is not the only method available to a debtor for the adjustment of his
legal relationship with his creditors” because “[h]owever unrealistic the remedy may
be in a particular situation, a debtor, in theory, and often in actuality, may adjust his
debts by negotiated agreement with his creditors”).
      18
         It is immaterial that some provisions of our eviction laws that delay relief
have definite time periods measured in an exact number of days. See, e.g., D.C.
Code § 42-3505.01(b) (giving tenants 30 days to cure a violation of an obligation of
tenancy). Not all procedural delays are so precisely quantifiable. See, e.g., D.C.
Code § 42-3505.01(k)(1), (2) (disallowing evictions, subject to some exceptions, on
days when the temperature is below freezing or when it is precipitating). In any
event, the filing moratorium also has a definite end: it will be lifted “when the
[public health] emergency ends, or is overcome. Even if there may be uncertainty
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residency requirement for divorce on the ground that it merely delayed the cause of
action and distinguishing Boddie where “[t]he operation of the filing fee . . . served
to exclude forever a certain segment of the population from obtaining a divorce in
the courts of Connecticut”).

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