2018 NY Slip Op 51958

Citation: 2018 NY Slip Op 51958
Jurisdiction: New York (state)
Source verification: cross_accepted_sealed
Original Source: https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_51958.htm ↗

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only those of Blumenfeld's children who are residing with him to occupy the Apartment. It must
also be noted that there is no allegation in the amended 2017 complaint that, when the occupancy
agreement was being negotiated, Dogwood LLC, Blumenfeld, Dogwood Realty Group, Boxwood
Realty Group, or Brad Blumenfeld objected to this unambiguous clause or that Blumenfeld and
his brother, as trustees of Dogwood LLC's two members, refused to sign the occupancy
agreement, unless Blumenfeld's sons and other relatives were permitted to live in the Apartment
without him. See Amended 2017 complaint, ¶¶ 26-29.

Moreover, even were Blumenfeld, and, therefore, his sons, subject to the occupancy terms
specific to the proprietary lessee, the Appellate Division, First Department held, almost nine
years after the Barbizon decision, in a case involving language essentially identical to that
in paragraph 14 of the proprietary lease, that the IAS court properly interpreted that provision as
permitting the occupancy of those other than the proprietary lessee only when the latter was
simultaneously living there. 445/86 Owners Corp. v Haydon, 300 AD2d 87, 88 (1st Dept
2002); see also Chiagkouris v 201 West
16 Owners Corp., 160 AD3d 469, 469-470 (1st Dept 2018); 230-79 Equity, Inc. v Frank, 50 Misc
3d 144 (A) (App Term, 1st Dept 2016), 2016 NY Slip Op 50245, *1. The First Department
reasoned that to permit all those individuals, other than the lessee, to live in the apartment
without the lessee, would also permit the lessee's domestic employees to live in the apartment
without the lessee, an interpretation characterized as "patently unintended if not absurd."
445/86 Owners Corp. v Haydon, 300 AD2d at 88. Thus, Blumenfeld's sons can live in the