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2018 NY Slip Op 51958

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2018 NY Slip Op 51958
Jurisdiction
New York (state)
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cross_accepted_sealed

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permit him to live in the Apartment unless his father concurrently resided there, and served a
notice to cure, which the Board later withdrew, after Lucas vacated the Apartment. Peterson
affidavit, exhibit 1, Amended 2017 complaint, ¶¶ 123-127.

Plaintiffs, relying on the 1994 Civil Court decision in Barbizon Owners Corp. v Chudick
(159 Misc 2d 1023, 1024-1027 [Civil Court, Queens County 1994]), maintain that
occupancy agreement paragraph 14 (a) in the instant case, which is virtually identical to
proprietary lease paragraph 14 in the Barbizon case, permits Blumenfeld's sons to live in
the Apartment, irrespective of whether Blumenfeld has been concurrently living there.
Proprietary lease, paragraph 14 (a) provides that occupancy by anyone other than the lessee, the
lessee's spouse, their children, grandchildren, parents, siblings, grandparents, and domestic
employees, and in no event by no more than one married couple, without the lessor's written
consent, was prohibited. In Barbizon, the Civil Court, interpreting that provision, found
that the proprietary lessee was not required to live in the apartment contemporaneously with his
brother, who had been living there alone.

However, as defendants aptly observe, Blumenfeld is not subject to the aforementioned
proprietary lease terms relative to the proprietary lessee's occupancy, because he is not the
proprietary lessee, and because the occupancy agreement provides, in essence, that
"notwithstanding any provision of the [proprietary] Lease or any other document," those to whom
Dogwood LLC may sublet or permit occupancy of the Apartment, with Stable's consent, is [*22]governed by the terms of the occupancy agreement, which
Blumenfeld signed on behalf of Dogwood LLC, by Dogwood Realty Group, and which permits