The parties do not dispute that the retaliation claim before us should be "analyzed under the same burden-shifting framework established for" other discrimination cases (Treglia v Town of Manlius, 313 F3d 713, 719 [2d Cir 2002]). Under this approach, a plaintiff bears the burden to establish a prima facie retaliation claim (see Forrest, 3 NY3d at 312-313). To meet that burden, the plaintiff must show that (1) they have "engaged in protected activity," (2) the defendant "was aware that" the plaintiff "participated in" the protected activity, (3) the plaintiff suffered adverse action based upon the activity, and (4) "there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action" (id.). Only the first and third elements of CityVision's retaliation claim are at issue here.
We address the third element of the retaliation claim first. In Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v White (548 US 53 [2006]), the Supreme Court considered the antiretaliation provision of title{**41 NY3d at 332} VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (see 42 [*3]USC § 2000e-3 [a]), which relates to employment discrimination. The Supreme Court concluded that the adverse action element is satisfied when "a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse" in that "it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination" (Burlington, 548 US at 68 [internal quotation marks omitted]). If a plaintiff meets this objective standard, the adverse action element is satisfied. The Supreme Court adopted this test to effectuate the intent of the antiretaliation provision—to protect an individual "from retaliation that produces an injury or harm" while "[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms" (Burlington, 5