Upon transfer from Supreme Court, the Appellate Division annulled the determination and granted the petition (see 204 AD3d 1358, 1361 [3d Dept 2022]). Concerning the first element of the retaliation claim, the Court concluded that the ALJ and DHR "improperly shifted the burden" to Pine Ridge and {**41 NY3d at 331}Pentkowski "to prove, in the first instance, that CityVision did not hold a reasonable belief that Pine Ridge was engaging in housing discrimination" (id. at 1360). The Court did not remit the matter to DHR for further proceedings, however, because "[t]he hearing evidence failed to support the finding that" Pine Ridge and Pentkowski "took adverse action against CityVision, under the third prong of the test for retaliation" (id.). The Court held that the "retaliation complaint must be dismissed" because it could not conclude that "the mere sending of the letter rose to the level of retaliation" (id. at 1360-1361). We granted DHR leave to appeal (see 39 NY3d 904 [2022]), and now reverse the Appellate Division's judgment and remit the matter for further proceedings.
II.
The Human Rights Law (Executive Law art 15) makes it "unlawful to retaliate against" a person "for opposing discriminatory practices" (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 312 [2004]). More specifically, Executive Law § 296 (7) states:
"It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person engaged in any activity to which this section applies to retaliate or discriminate against any person because [they have] opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because [they have] filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article."