[3] Finally, we find that the voucher program does not violate the Urstadt Law (McKinney's Uncons Laws of NY § 8605 [as added by L 1971, ch 372, as amended]). "The 'Urstadt Law was intended to check City attempts, whether by local law or regulation, to expand the set of buildings subject to rent control or stabilization' " (Alston v Starrett City, Inc., 161 AD3d at 39, quoting City of New York v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 97 NY2d 216, 227 [2001]). Here, a landlord's acceptance of such security deposit vouchers "will have no impact in expanding the buildings subject to the rent stabilization law or expanding regulation under the rent laws" (Tapia v Successful Mgt. Corp., 79 AD3d at 425 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.
Accordingly the order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Julio Rodriguez, III, J.), entered June 5, 2019, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendants' motion to dismiss the second amended complaint seeking an order declaring that the Human Resources Administration's security deposit voucher program does not fall within the "source of income" provisions of the New York City Human Rights Law, and that the program was prohibited by the Urstadt Law and Social Services Law § 143-c, should be affirmed, without costs.
Gische, J.P., Kapnick and Moulton, JJ., concur.
Order Supreme Court, New York County, entered June 5, 2019, affirmed, without costs.
Footnotes