Plaintiff commenced the instant declaratory judgment action alleging that the City had tried to force landlords to accept HRA security vouchers in lieu of a cash security deposit. Estates alleged three causes of action: a judgment declaring the "source of income" provisions of the HRL do not apply to HRA security vouchers; a judgment declaring the City's conduct was prohibited by the Urstadt Law, which prohibits any increase to the number of rent-controlled or rent-stabilized buildings; and a judgment declaring the City's conduct was prohibited by Social Services Law § 143-c, which governs security deposits paid by HRA.
Defendants moved to dismiss arguing plaintiff failed to state a cause of action. Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss concluding that there was no meaningful distinction between the term "income" and "security deposit," or between "rent" and "security deposit," and further that the HRA security voucher is a "lawful source of income" for purposes of Administrative Code § 8-107 (5) (a) (1) (2019 NY Slip Op 31598[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2019]).
Discussion
[1] We find that the court correctly concluded that HRA's security deposit vouchers are a "lawful source of income" under the City HRL (Administrative Code § 8-102) and are therefore included in the HRL's prohibition against discrimination by a landlord against a prospective tenant because of "any lawful source of income" (Administrative Code § 8-107 [5] [a] [1]). "The term 'lawful source of income' includes income derived from social security, or any form of federal, state or local public assistance or housing assistance including section 8 vouchers"[FN1] (Administrative Code § 8-102; see Tapia v Successful Mgt. Corp., 79 AD3d 422 [1st Dept 2010]).{**184 AD3d at 60}