Section 223-b has a natural flow from prohibition to consequences. Subdivision (1) (§ 223-b [1]) starts by prohibiting a landlord from terminating a tenancy "to punish the tenant for complaining to government authorities" (Matter of Kirkview Assoc. LP v Amrock, 160 AD3d 1108, 1109 [3d Dept 2018], quoting Pena v Lockenwitz, 53 Misc 3d 428, 431 [Cohoes City Ct{**62 Misc 3d at 281} 2016]). Subdivision (2) of the statute (§ 223-b [2]) deals with the consequences for a landlord who engages in a retaliatory act—the landlord must extend the lease. However, the lease need not be extended indefinitely for an act of retaliation. The retaliatory act is absolved after a year in the sense no further lease extension is required. But this absolution applies to past acts and says nothing about a landlord's subsequent violation of the statute. Thus, since the no further extension language of section 223-b (2) deals with the consequences of a previous retaliatory act by the landlord, it cannot be implied, as a matter of sound statutory construction, that section 223-b (2) supersedes section 223-b (1) and grants immunity from all future retaliatory conduct by the landlord under section 223-b (1).
Therefore, the court finds that a new retaliatory act renders the no further extension language inoperative. Thus, if a landlord refuses to extend a tenancy beyond the one year required by section 223-b (2) because a tenant made a new good faith complaint to a governmental authority concerning a health or safety issue or any other good faith action relating to enforcing the warranty of habitability during the course of the extended tenancy, then the refusal to further extend the tenancy is illegal. MLR's motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.