But that does not quite answer the question raised—whether section 223-b (2)'s no further extension language blankets the landlord with immunity to terminate the tenancy in retaliation for the tenant engaging in a protected activity during the one-year renewal period. It is true, as MLR points out, that the no further extension provision contains no disqualifying clause. That is, the statute does not read "a landlord shall not be required . . . to further extend or continue such tenancy [unless the decision not to further extend the tenancy is made in retaliation for a [*4]protected activity under section 223-b (1) within the last six months of the renewal period]."
If Real Property Law § 223-b (2) is viewed in isolation from the remaining subdivisions of section 223-b, MLR's position is almost unassailable. However, a subdivision should not be interpreted in isolation from the other sections of the law. Rather, "[s]tatutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor" (United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 US 365, 371 [1988]). Thus, the court must construe the statute with the aid of the whole text canon (see generally Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 24 at 167 [2012]). The canon implores that the "meaning of a statute is to be looked for, not in any single section, but in all the parts together and in their relation to the end in view" (Panama Refining Co. v Ryan, 293 US 388, 439 [1935, Cardozo, J., dissenting]).