observations and test results on inspection, nor any opinion based thereon, without first
establishing, probably outside the presence of the jury, that the proposed testimony is
relevant and non-speculative.
The Affidavit of Veronica Kero, submitted by Defendants for the first time in reply, has not
been considered. (See Bednoski v
County of Suffolk, 67 AD3d 616, 617 [2d Dept 2009]; Levine v Fogotson's Cent. Auto. & Elec.,
Inc., 41 AD3d 552, 553 [2d Dept 2007]; Jackson-[*13]Cutler v Long, 2 AD3d
590 [2d Dept 2003].)
In sum, Plaintiff's motion for a unified trial is granted; that aspect of Plaintiff's motion to
admit documents marked into evidence at trial is granted in part in accordance with this opinion,
and the parties shall be prepared to address the open issues at the final pre-trial conference, now
scheduled for October 29, 2012; that aspect of Plaintiff's motion to preclude references to drug
use in his medical records is granted in part in accordance with this opinion; Defendants' motion
to limit evidence of Dr. Grant's treatment of Plaintiff is denied, and the parties shall be prepared
at the final pre-trial conference to address Plaintiff's request for costs pursuant to Rule 130;
Defendants' motion to preclude "Notices of Violation," understood as seeking preclusion of the
complaint records included with the papers, is granted; Defendants' motion to preclude certain
testimony of Edward Olmstead is granted in accordance with this opinion.
October 4, 2012____________________
Jack M. Battaglia
Justice, Supreme Court