[2011]; DiSanza v City of New York, 11 NY3d 766, 767 [2008]; Rui-Jiau Liu v City of White Plains, 95
AD3d 1192, 1194 [2d Dept 2012]; Miller v Kings Park Cent. School Dist., 54 AD3d 314, 315 [2d
Dept 2008]; Hyland v City of New
York, 32 AD3d 822, 824 [2d Dept 2006]; Reyes v City of New York, 29 AD3d 667, 668 [2d Dept 2006];
McCarthy v State of New York, 167 AD2d 516, 517 [2d Dept 1990].)
Mr. Olmstead's October 20, 2011 report does not purport to render an opinion that the
conditions he inspected on that day were the same as those to which Plaintiff was exposed during
his occupancy of the apartment (see Rui-Jiau v City of White Plains, 95 AD3d at 1194),
which would, in any event, appear to undermine Plaintiff's theory as to the development of the
harmful condition over time; nor does Mr. Olmstead provide the basis for "relation-back"
testimony, i.e., using his observations and test results as bases for "extrapolating" what
the conditions must have been during Plaintiff's occupancy (see Romano v Stanley, 90
NY2d 444, 450 n [1997]; People v O'Connor, 290 AD2d 519, 520 [2d Dept 2002]
["retrograde extrapolation"].)
Indeed, Defendants may prove too much in that their noticed expert, Veronica Kero,
inspected the apartment on February 19, 2010, and her report dated March 8, 2010 suffers from
the same deficiencies as Mr. Olmstead's. The Court has noted that the expert disclosure for
neither expert limits the proposed testimony to opinions based on observations and test results on
the expert's respective inspections, and the Court is not being asked to limit the testimony of
either expert on those other subjects.
But, absent stipulation of the parties, neither expert will be permitted to testify to