Next, we ask whether the settlement agreement violated the antiwaiver provision by
actually waiving any of the Allens’ tenant rights listed in the provision.
4
Princeton does not raise RAP 2.5(a). It appears from the record below that the Allens did not
make their RCW 59.18.230(1)(b) argument to the superior court in nearly the same detail as they
do here. Regardless of whether each of their arguments were argued sufficiently to preserve them
for appeal, RAP 2.5(a) is discretionary. See Fireside Bank v. Askins, 195 Wn.2d 365, 374, 460
P.3d 157 (2020). Here, we exercise our discretion to review the Allens’ arguments both because
Princeton fails to raise RAP 2.5(a) and because of the public interest in construing newly enacted
provisions of RLTA.
10
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No. 58183-3-II
The Allens contend it does. They point to the settlement agreement’s provision for an
immediate issuance of a writ and contend that waives a number of tenant rights. Br. of Appellants
at 21-30 (citing, for example, right to “just cause” evictions, right to 14-day notice for failure to
pay rent, right to unilaterally reinstate tenancy after failure to rent, right to request a payment plan,
and right to mediation). Thus, they argue the settlement agreement was void and unenforceable
under RCW 59.18.230(1)(b).
We conclude it is unnecessary to decide whether each of the specific rights listed by the
Allens are directly implicated by this dispute because of the persuasiveness of the general
proposition that RCW 59.18.230(1)(b) invalidates a settlement agreement that waives any tenant
right under RLTA (except those in RCW 59.18.360), which is what this settlement agreement
does.