• RCW 59.18.650(6)(b). The right to have a notice of eviction identify the facts and
circumstances with enough specificity so as to enable the tenant to prepare a defense.
• RCW 59.18.410(2). The right to restore a tenancy after defaulting in the payment of
rent within five days of entry of judgment by following certain procedures.
8
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No. 58183-3-II
• RCW 59.18.410(3). The right to request a repayment plan after forfeiture of the
tenancy due to nonpayment of rent.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law. City of Seattle v. Burlington N. R.R.,
145 Wn.2d 661, 665, 41 P.3d 1169 (2002). “The primary objective of any statutory construction
inquiry is ‘to ascertain and carry out the intent of the Legislature.’ ” HomeStreet, Inc. v. Dep’t of
Revenue, 166 Wn.2d 444, 451, 210 P.3d 297 (2009) (quoting Rozner v. City of Bellevue,
116 Wn.2d 342, 347, 804 P.2d 24 (1991)).
The language of the statute is the starting point. State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110,
156 P.3d 201 (2007). If that language lends itself to only one interpretation, the inquiry ends
because plain language does not require construction. Id. Where a statute is unambiguous, its
words must be given their plain meaning and it will be presumed that the legislature’s intent has
been clearly expressed. Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wn.2d 416, 422-23, 103 P.3d 1230 (2005).
The unlawful detainer statutes, chapters 59.12 and 59.18 RCW, are strictly construed in
favor of the tenant. Randy Reynolds & Assocs., Inc. v. Harmon, 193 Wn.2d 143, 156, 437 P.3d
677 (2019).
B. APPLICATION
The Allens argue that RCW 59.18.230(1)(b) bars any settlement agreement, like their