3
It is also worth noting the practicalities of this interpretation. As evidenced by this record, an
owner may face difficulties attempting to sell or advertise a property when a tenant is still in
possession of the residence.
7
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
No. 56232-4-II
Because RCW 59.18.650(2)(e) requires an owner to make reasonable attempts to sell or
advertise the residence within 30 days after the tenant has vacated, but not before the tenant has
vacated, we affirm the trial court’s order granting a writ of restitution to Klee.
ATTORNEY FEES
Klee requests attorney fees under RAP 18.1, RCW 59.18.290(2), and the terms of the
parties’ lease.
RAP 18.1(a) allows a party to request reasonable attorney fees if applicable law provides
for the recovery of fees. RCW 59.18.290(2) states:
It is unlawful for the tenant to hold over in the premises or exclude the landlord
therefrom after the termination of the rental agreement except under a valid court
order so authorizing. Any landlord so deprived of possession of premises in
violation of this section may recover possession of the property and damages
sustained by him or her, and the prevailing party may recover his or her costs of
suit or arbitration and reasonable attorneys’ fees subject to subsections (3) and (4)
of this section.
Under RCW 59.18.290(3), “[w]here the court has entered a judgment in favor of the landlord
restoring possession of the property to the landlord, the court may award reasonable attorneys’
fees to the landlord.”
Klee is the prevailing party in this appeal. Although our record does not reflect that the trial
court entered a judgment in Klee’s favor, the trial court restored possession of the property to Klee