For the purposes of this subsection (2)(e), an owner “elects to sell” when the owner
makes reasonable attempts to sell the dwelling within 30 days after the tenant has
vacated, including, at a minimum, listing it for sale at a reasonable price with a
realty agency or advertising it for sale at a reasonable price by listing it on the real
estate multiple listing service.
Id. There is a rebuttable presumption that the owner did not elect to sell if (1) within 30 days after
the tenant has vacated the residence, the owner does not list or advertise the residence for sale at a
reasonable price, or (2) within 90 days after the tenant has vacated the residence, or the date the
residence was listed for sale, if later, the owner withdraws the residence from the market, rents to
someone else, or “otherwise indicates that the owner does not intend to sell the unit.” RCW
59.18.650(2)(e)(i)-(ii).
B. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The parties dispute the meaning of elects to sell, which is defined in the statute as outlined
above. RCW 59.18.650(2)(e).
4
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
No. 56232-4-II
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Dep’t of Ecology v.
Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). Our “objective is to ascertain and
carry out the [l]egislature’s intent.” Id. “[I]f the statute’s meaning is plain on its face,” we “must
give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.” Id. at 9-10. We are to
discern plain meaning “ ‘from the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the
statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.’ ”