Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Citation
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Parent Document
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Jurisdiction
- Vermont (state)
- Effective Date
- 2006-02-10
Other Sections in This Document (25)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
- Electric Man, Inc. v. Charos, 179 Vt. 351 (2006)
Full Text
1,142 chars¶ 18. Nevertheless, we conclude that such a remand is unnecessary. The court found that contractor was the substantially prevailing party, so an award of attorneys’ fees was mandatory. Contractor’s fee request was supported by a lengthy and detailed affidavit of an experienced commercial litigator. The court did not question the reasonableness of the fees charged by contractor’s counsel or the time expended in the litigation, and based its calculation on those fees. Neither the trial court nor the parties sought the kind of adjustment discussed in L’Esperance. Contractor apparently received close to the damages he sought, defeated all third-party claims, and recovered on every theory he raised. While the trial court may have indicated that the case was close and that owners’ “claims were not meritless,” a fee award is compensatory, so owners’ good faith in pursuing their claims is not a significant factor. *359Perhaps most importantly, we hold as a matter of law that there was a common core of facts shared among every claim on which contractor recovered. Thus, consideration of this question by the trial court is unnecessary.