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Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — D2 51946-1-II Published Opinion.pdf

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Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — D2 51946-1-II Published Opinion.pdf
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Washington (state)
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instrument had legal efficacy. If so, the evidence was found sufficient. See Haislip, 77 Wn.2d at

842; Bradshaw, 3 Wn. App. 2d at 194; Aitken, 79 Wn. App. at 894. If not, the evidence was

found insufficient. See Taes, 5 Wn.2d at 53-54; Smith, 72 Wn. App. at 243; Stiltner, 4 Wn. App.

at 38.

We recognize that Miller can be distinguished. Whether a no-contact order is valid is

different than whether a written instrument has legal efficacy. Division One in Hill noted that a

court order is the result of a proceeding with due process protections, and that is not the case for

written instruments. Slip op. at 16. However, the Supreme Court in Miller did not base its

analysis on the nature of the order itself, but on the fact that the validity of such an order is a

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No. 51946-1-II

question of law “uniquely within the province of the court.” 156 Wn.2d at 31. We reach the

same conclusion regarding the legal efficacy of an instrument.

We conclude that the legal efficacy of Smith’s bank account applications was a question

of law for the trial court. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in declining to give

Smith’s legal efficacy jury instruction.

CONCLUSION

We affirm Smith’s convictions, but we remand for the trial court to strike the criminal

filing fee from the judgment and sentence.

A majority of the panel having determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion

will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for

public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we hold that (1) the trial court’s exclusion of