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Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — D2 47696-7-II Published Opinion.pdf

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Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — D2 47696-7-II Published Opinion.pdf
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Washington (state)
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subsection (1) in isolation from the other subsections of 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l). Subsection (5)

states that public housing leases must require that a PHA “not terminate the tenancy except for

serious or repeated violation of the terms or conditions of the lease or for other good cause.”

This provision clearly establishes that PHAs can terminate a tenancy for violation of lease

provisions or other good cause. And other subsections allow termination on additional grounds.

Therefore, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l) provides for both automatic renewal and termination for cause

before the end of the term of public housing leases.

Considered as a whole, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l) treats automatic renewal and termination as

alternatives. Although the language could be clearer, it is reasonable to interpret the statute as

allowing either termination for cause or automatic renewal if the lease has not been terminated.

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No. 47696-7-II

This interpretation is consistent with dictionary definitions of “terminate” and “renew.”

“Terminate” means “to bring to an ending or cessation in time, sequence, or continuity” or “to

end formally and definitely.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2359

(2002). The dictionary defines “renew” as “to make new again.” Id. at 1922. A lease that has

“ended definitely” no longer exists and cannot logically be “made new again.” Under this

interpretation, a lease that has been terminated could not automatically renew.

Further, we interpret statutory language in a way that avoids an absurd result. Five

Corners, 173 Wn.2d at 311. It simply makes no sense to hold that a lease that has been lawfully

terminated can automatically renew.