place, abode, or habitation to which one intends to return as distinguished from a place of
temporary sojourn or transient visit." WEBSTER' S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1931 ( 1969).
In State v. Pickett, 95 Wn. App. 475, 478, 975 P. 2d 584 ( 1999), Division One of this court held
that it was adopting this " ordinary meaning" of residence: " the place where a person lives as either
a temporary or permanent dwelling, a place to which one intends to return, as distinguished from
a place of temporary sojourn or transient visit." We relied on the " ordinary meaning" articulated
in Pickett in Jenkins, 100 Wn. App. at 91. Thus, contrary to Breidt' s argument, " residence" has
been sufficiently defined such that an ordinary person would understand that the term to mean a
place where a person intends to return to live as opposed to a place that he or she is just visiting.
The term " residence" is sufficiently definitive to allow an ordinary person to understand
what the term means. Breidt fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the term " residence" is
unconstitutionally vague
C. " RESIDENCE ADDRESS" AND " CHANGE"
Breidt also argues that the statute does not adequately define the terms " change" or
residence address." We disagree.
In Jenkins, the term " address" was not defined in the statute. Jenkins, 100 Wn. App. at 90.
We held that the term "[ address] has been defined in Washington as ` the place where mail or other
communications will reach a person,' which ` may be other than a person' s residence. ' Id.
quoting State v. Morgan, 32 Wn. App. 236, 237, 646 P. 2d 1387 ( 1982)). Although the Jenkins
court established the plain meaning of the term " address," it determined that its use was vague in