Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 322 ( 1926)). Therefore, to prove the failure to
register statute is unconstitutionally vague, Breidt " must show beyond a reasonable doubt that
either ( 1) the statute does not define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is proscribed, or (2) the statute does not provide ascertainable
standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary enforcement." Coria, 120 Wn.2d at 163.
Breidt only argues that the terms of the statute are not sufficiently defined. Specifically,
Breidt argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to define the terms
residence," " change," and " residence address." Br. of Appellant at 5 - 6. In addition, Breidt argues
that the entire phrase " changes his or her residence address" is vague. Br. of Appellant at 7.
When a statute does not define a term, the statute is not automatically deemed
unconstitutionally vague. Jenkins, 100 Wn. App. at 90. Instead, when terms are not defined in a
statute, they are given their ordinary meaning. Id.
B. " RESIDENCE"
Addressing the term " residence," Breidt recognizes that several cases have applied the
ordinary meaning of the term " residence," but appears to argue that, because courts have looked
at " a variety of factors to determine whether or not a particular dwelling qualifies as a residence,"
a person of ordinary intelligence would not be able to understand the meaning of the term
residence. Br. of Appellant at 6. We disagree.
No. 45190 -5 - II
The term " residence" is commonly understood as " a temporary or permanent dwelling