Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 723421.pdf

Citation: Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 723421.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/723421.pdf ↗

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24, 29, 948 P.2d 816 (1997). "Such a motion can be granted only when it can be

said, as a matter of law, that there is no competent and substantial evidence

upon which the verdict can rest." State v. Hall. 74 Wn.2d 726, 727, 446 P.2d 323
(1968). "Substantial evidence is said to exist if it is sufficient to persuade a fair-
minded, rational person of the truth of the declared premise." Brown v. Superior

Underwriters. 30 Wn. App. 303, 306, 632 P.2d 887 (1980).

When reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law, appellate courts

apply the same standard as the trial court. Guiiosa v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc.. 144
Wn.2d 907, 915, 32 P.3d 250 (2001).

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No. 72342-1-1/28

Lodis contends that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on

Corbis's after-acquired evidence defense.

As summarized above, pursuant to the after-acquired evidence defense,

an employer can avoid back pay and other remedies for wrongful discharge by
coming forward with evidence of an employee's misconduct that was acquired
after the discharge, but only if it can prove by a preponderance of the evidence

"that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds alone if
the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge." McKennon, 513 U.S.
at 362-63.

In order to carry its burden, an employer is not required "to come forward
with proof that they discharged other employees for the precise misconduct at
issue (though such evidence would no doubt be helpful to their case)." O'Day v.
McDonnell Douolas Helicopter Co.. 79 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 1996). An