Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 723421.pdf

Citation: Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 723421.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/723421.pdf ↗

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The trial court did not abuse its direction in admitting evidence of the

second jury's breach of fiduciary duty verdict.

12 The same concern for reigning in the proceedings in order to avoid juryconfusion
explains the trial court's decisions (1) to refuse to give an instruction on the elements ofbreach of
fiduciary duty (a claim that, after all, was not directly at issue therein), and (2) to limit the
presentation ofevidence regarding the claims that had been at issue in the second trial.

-26-

No. 72342-1-1/27

Lodis next contends that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to

consider Corbis's "after-acquired evidence" affirmative defense. This is so, he

asserts, because "Corbis presented insufficient evidence for the after-acquired

evidence defense ... to be presented to the jury." His contention is unavailing.

CR 50(a)(1), regarding motions for judgment as a matter of law, provides:

If, during a trial by jury, a party has been fully heard with respect to
an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a
reasonable jury to find or have found for that party with respect to
that issue, the court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of
law against the party on any claim . . . that cannot under the
controlling law be maintained without a favorable finding on that
issue.

"Granting a motion for judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when,

viewing the evidence most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court can say,

as a matter of law, there is no substantial evidence or reasonable inference to

sustain a verdict for the nonmoving party." Sing v. John L. Scott. Inc.. 134 Wn.2d