Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Citation
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Parent Document
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Jurisdiction
- Connecticut (state)
- Effective Date
- 1993-07-20
Other Sections in This Document (27)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
- Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133 (1993)
Full Text
1,460 charsWhere prejudgment interest is expressly allowed by statute, a rate of interest is generally specified in the statute. See, e.g., General Statutes §§ 49-41a (b) and *14049-42. Under CUTPA, however, prejudgment interest is not expressly allowed and, therefore, no rate of interest is stated. The relevant part of General Statutes § 42-1 lOg (a), on which the trial court relied in awarding interest on the punitive damages, states only that “[t]he court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages and may provide such equitable relief as it deems necessary or proper ” (Emphasis added.) We are unwilling to conclude that the trial court may award retroactive interest on punitive damages under the guise of “equitable relief” because this would also require us to conclude that the trial court may determine the proper rate of interest. The trial court awarded interest “at the legal rate.” The “legal rate” cannot be determined, however, because there is no statute expressly providing for prejudgment interest in this case. We cannot accept the plaintiffs’ argument that the inherent equitable powers of the trier under § 42-1 lOg, together with the provisions of § 37-3a, support an award of interest at the rate of 10 percent from the date their apartment was condemned until satisfaction of the judgment. We agree with the defendants that the trial court lacked the power, statutorily or equitably, to award prejudgment interest on punitive damages. Ill