tions to terminate the tenancy and was a necessary predicate for the instant
holdover proceeding.
1078 86 MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS, 3d SERIES
tions (Jewish Bd. of Family & Children’s Servs., Inc. v Sabater,
82 Misc 3d 1241[A], 2024 NY Slip Op 50516[U] [Civ Ct, Bronx
County 2024]), and other statutory provisions (see e.g. Herzl
Realty LLC v Almodovar, 79 Misc 3d 1223[A], 2023 NY Slip Op
50708[U] [Civ Ct, Kings County 2023] [notice of termination
did not address Emergency Rental Assistance Program (ERAP)
protections]). Real Property Law § 215 provides that ‘‘[n]o
landlord shall . . . by failure to renew any lease . . . remove
any tenant from’’ an apartment covered by GCEL ‘‘except for
good cause.’’ Because this statutory provision requires good
cause for the act of nonrenewal itself, section 226-c notices for
units covered under GCEL must include factual allegations
sufficient to satisfy the Hughes reasonableness standard.
What this standard requires in view of the ‘‘attendant cir-
cumstances’’ of this residential holdover proceeding on the basis
of nonpayment under GCEL is an issue of first impression.
However, in a commercial context, holdover proceedings based
upon rent nonpayment are not new, and decisions of the First
and Second Departments addressing these are instructive (see
542 Holding Corp. v Prince Fashions, Inc., 46 AD3d 309 [1st
Dept 2007]; Westhampton Cabins & Cabanas Owners Corp. v
Westhampton Bath & Tennis Club Owners Corp., 62 AD3d 987,
988 [2d Dept 2009]). In Prince Fashions, the Court evaluated a
notice to cure threatening termination of the lease on the basis
of nonpayment of rent. In determining the notice passed
muster, the Court borrowed the standard commonly applied to
rent demands in nonpayment proceedings, citing Schwartz v