henleitner, 73 Misc 2d 192, 193 [App Term, 1st Dept 1973]) and
include a degree of factual specificity ‘‘reasonable[ ] in view of
all attendant circumstances’’ (Hughes v Lenox Hill Hosp., 226
AD2d 4, 17 [1st Dept 1996], lv dismissed & denied 90 NY2d
829 [1997]). She argues that where a landlord serves notice of
its intention not to renew a lease on grounds of nonpayment
but fails to include an accounting or timeline of the alleged ar-
rears, the notice fails under these standards (see affirmation of
Rachel Phillips, NYSCEF Doc No. 11 ¶¶ 45-52).
Petitioner argues in opposition that it has complied with all
statutory requirements in commencing this proceeding (see af-
firmation of Shari S. Laskowitz, NYSCEF Doc No. 16 ¶ 15). It
notes that neither section 226-c nor 231-c of the Real Property
Law expressly requires that a notice of nonrenewal alleging
nonpayment include an accounting of the alleged arrears (id.
¶¶ 12-15). It argues that the legislature in section 231-c went
to great lengths to identify all the information a landlord is
RP WIMBLEDON, LLC v CHISHOLM [86 Misc 3d 1075] 1077
required to provide to a tenant under GCEL, and that its omis-
sion of any calculation of rent arrears should be determinative
(id. ¶ 13).
A baseline requirement for any notice terminating a tenancy
and serving as the basis for an eviction proceeding is that the
notice be ‘‘clear, unambiguous and unequivocal’’ (City of Buffalo
Urban Renewal Agency v Lane Bryant Queens, 90 AD2d 976,
977 [4th Dept 1982], affd 59 NY2d 825 [1983]).* Termination
notices have failed to meet the aforementioned standard where
their language has been unclear regarding whether the lease
was being terminated (see Ellivkroy Realty Corp. v HDP 86
Sponsor Corp., 162 AD2d 238, 238 [1st Dept 1990]), when such