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ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)

Citation
ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
Parent Document
ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson (2025)
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (state)
Effective Date
2025-05-13

Full Text

2,517 chars
vided no more than a conclusory statement in this
       regard, unaccompanied by any legal authority, we
       decline to address this argument. See MacDermid, Inc.
       v. Leonetti, 328 Conn. 726, 748, 183 A.3d 611 (2018)
       (actual analysis, not mere assertions, is required for
       briefing to be adequate).
          Moreover, the unambiguous language of the lease
       agreement provided notice to the defendant that his
       failure to pay his rent on the first of each month or
       within nine days thereafter would constitute a default
       of the agreement and that, ‘‘if [his] rent [was] delinquent,
       [he] immediately forfeit[ed] all rights to occupy the
       apartment any longer . . . .’’ That language clearly
       indicates that, outside of the nine day grace period,
       there is no right to cure once a tenant defaults on his
       rent obligation. See Gateway Development/East Lyme,
       LLC v. Duong, supra, 227 Conn. App. 47–48 (plain and
       unambiguous language of sublease agreement made
       clear that pretermination notice and cure period were
       not required in context of default for nonpayment of
       rent where agreement provided that, ‘‘if the defendants
       fail to pay rent within ten days after it is due, the plaintiff
       may ‘immediately initiate’ legal action to recover pos-
       session of the premises, ‘without prior notice’ to the
       defendants’’). We therefore conclude that the defen-
       dant’s argument that he had a right to cure his nonpay-
       ment of rent is unavailing.10
          The judgment is affirmed.
          In this opinion the other judges concurred.
          10
             The defendant argues in his reply brief that the provision of General
       Statutes § 47a-23 that requires a landlord to give a defaulting tenant three
       days notice in the notice to quit must be read to mean that ‘‘the time
       between the service of the notice [to quit] and the quit date is the mandatory
       reasonable time to cure said breach.’’ Not only does this court not consider
       claims made for the first time in a reply brief; see Lewis v. Commissioner
       of Correction, 211 Conn. App. 77, 101, 271 A.3d 1058 (arguments cannot be
       raised for first time in reply brief), cert. denied, 343 Conn. 924, 275 A.3d
       1213, cert. denied sub nom. Lewis v. Quiros,          U.S.     , 143 S. Ct. 335,
       214 L. Ed. 2d 150 (2022); but this argument has no basis in the law.