Goes v. Feldman, 391 N.E.2d 943 (1979)

Citation: Goes v. Feldman, 391 N.E.2d 943 (1979)
Parent Document: Goes v. Feldman, 391 N.E.2d 943 (1979)
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts (state)
Effective Date: 1979-07-11
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2126348/goes-v-feldman/ ↗

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A commentator has suggested that, in analyzing whether a statute ought to have retroactive effect, the “court must determine whether at the date of enactment the event or events which have occurred up to that point create a sufficiently strong interest to justify an interpretation that the legislature could not in the absence of specific language have intended to destroy or modify such interest.” Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51 Nw. U.L. Rev. 540, 550-551 (1957). In the case before us we cannot say the defendant had a significant right not to be sued in the Housing Court, as opposed to the District Court or Superior Court. To require that this case and other c. 93A cases lauñched in the Housing Court before April 6, 1979, be tried all over again senselessly wastes the time of litigants, witnesses, lawyers and courts; presumably the Legislature and the Governor acted with such celerity in the enactment of St. 1979, c. 72, precisely in order to avoid so undesirable a consequence. Against these considerations it seems dogmatic and formalistic to insist that where jurisdiction is absent at the inception of litigation, it cannot subsequently be conferred because the litigation was *91

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