Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Nunez, 460 Mass. 511 (2011)

Citation: Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Nunez, 460 Mass. 511 (2011)
Parent Document: Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Nunez, 460 Mass. 511 (2011)
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts (state)
Effective Date: 2011-09-06
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6580334/federal-national-mortgage-assn-v-nunez/ ↗

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Fannie Mae also argues that the notice to quit transformed Nunez’s tenancy from a tenancy at will into a tenancy at sufferance, see Hodge v. King, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 746, 753 (1992), and that a tenant at sufferance is not a “tenant” as defined in G. L. c. 186A, § 1. Therefore, according to Fannie Mae, the Housing Court’s application of the statute to this case was retroactive because, in order to apply the statute, the court necessarily reached back and transformed Nunez’s tenancy into a tenancy at will to which the statute was applicable. This argument fails because a “tenant” under G. L. c. 186A, § 1, is defined as “a person or group of persons who at the time of foreclosure is entitled to occupy a housing accommodation pursuant to a bona fide lease or tenancy or a tenancy at will” (emphasis added). Because the determination whether a person is a “tenant” under the act looks to the “time of foreclosure,” and because there is no dispute that Nunez was a “[t]enant” as defined under G. L. c. 186A, § 1, “at the time of foreclosure,” his subsequent receipt of a notice to quit could not remove him from the protection of the act.

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