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INTERNAL PROTOTYPE — NOT LEGAL ADVICE — DO NOT SEND

Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Nunez, 460 Mass. 511 (2011)

Citation
Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Nunez, 460 Mass. 511 (2011)
Parent Document
Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Nunez, 460 Mass. 511 (2011)
Jurisdiction
Massachusetts (state)
Effective Date
2011-09-06

Other Sections in This Document (43)

Full Text

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We interpret the word “action” in the definition of “[ejvic*519tion” in G. L. c. 186A, § 1, to mean any act or conduct, not necessarily a legal action, and we understand the phrase “without limitation” to mean the broadest reasonable definition of acts, without exception. See Pyle v. School Comm, of S. Hadley, 423 Mass. 283, 285-286 (1996) (“without limitation” leaves no room to construe exceptions other than as listed in the statute). The word “eviction,” as used in the statute, is therefore not limited to the service of a notice to quit or initiation of a summary process action: it includes any act that results in the actual or constructive eviction of a tenant, and any intermediate act that is “intended to actually or constructively evict a tenant or otherwise compel a tenant to vacate such housing accommodation.” G. L. c. 186A, § 1. Where the eviction is constructive, the “action” may be the conduct that renders the housing unit uninhabitable, such as the denial of heat in winter. Where the eviction is “actual,” that is, arises from a summary process action, the “action” may be the foreclosing owner’s efforts to prosecute the eviction at any of the various stages in a summary process eviction: termination of the tenancy by service of an effective notice to quit, filing of a summary process complaint, entry of judgment on behalf of the plaintiff in the summary process action, the issuance of an execution on expiration of the statutory appeal period, service of a forty-eight hour notice, and, finally, levy on the execution to recover physical possession of the residence, effectuating the eviction.9