Adjartey v. Cent. Div. of the Hous. Court Departmentand, 120 N.E.3d 297 (2019)

Citation: Adjartey v. Cent. Div. of the Hous. Court Departmentand, 120 N.E.3d 297 (2019)
Parent Document: Adjartey v. Cent. Div. of the Hous. Court Departmentand, 120 N.E.3d 297 (2019)
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts (state)
Effective Date: 2019-04-10
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7178223/adjartey-v-cent-div-of-the-hous... ↗

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For the sake of simplicity, we often refer to Housing Court plaintiffs as "landlords" and Housing Court defendants as "tenants." We acknowledge that these terms do not fully capture all of the individuals who initiate and defend against summary process evictions. In fact, eight categories of persons may initiate a summary process eviction under G. L. c. 239, § 1 : (1) persons whose premises has been forcibly entered; (2) persons forcibly and unlawfully kept out of possession of their premises by one who entered the premises peaceably; (3) lessors whose tenants hold over -- that is, remain on the property -- without right after the termination of the lease; (4) purchasers of the premises after a mortgage has been foreclosed by a sale; (5) purchasers of the premises where the seller (or any person holding under the seller) refuses to surrender possession; (6) persons entitled to the premises under a tax title foreclosure by decree of the Land Court; (7) sellers of land where the purchaser is in possession of the premises but fails to take title as called for in the written agreement to purchase; and (8) persons who have obtained registered title in the Land Court, except where the person in possession has erected buildings or improvements on the land and held possession of the land for six years, or held the land under a title he or she had reason to believe was good. Under G. L. c. 239, § 1A, a landlord may initiate a no-fault summary process action thirty days prior to a lease's termination where certain statutory requirements are met and where there are "substantial grounds upon which the court could reasonably conclude that the defendant is likely to continue in possession of the premises at issue without right after the designated termination date."

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