It is now urged by plaintiff that this was an erroneous conclusion in that there is no indication, from the language of the statute, that it was the legislative intent to limit or restrict the application of section 233 to deposits of security made under leases relating to real property located in this State, and to deny its application where the lease related to real property situated without the State.
It is true that the language of section 233 contains no express limitation of specific restriction of its provisions to leases of real property located only in this State, and that it does not explicitly exclude from its application deposits of security made under leases relating to real property located outside the State. Nonetheless I am of opinion that such limitation and restriction were intended.
Where the intent and extent of a statute appear to be left doubtful by its language the court may resort to extrinsic evidence in the construction thereof and in this connection it may consider facts of contemporary history, the previous state of the law, the circumstances and conditions leading to its enactment and especially the evil which it was designed to correct and the remedy intended (Matter of Hamlin, 226. N. Y. 407; Archer v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 218 N. Y. 18; Matter of Clark, 168 N. Y. 427; Black, Interpretation of Laws [2d ed.], § 91; Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, §§ 28-29; Crawford, Statutory Construction [1940 ed.], §§ 210, 211, 225).
“ But courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety recur to the history of the times when it was passed; and this is frequently necessary, in order to ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of the particular provisions in it.” (United States v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S. 72, 79.)