4
because there was no eviction action pending, and therefore plaintiff was not entitled to
declaratory relief on this claim. Accordingly, the court granted summary adjudication to
plaintiff as to the first issue only. Plaintiff subsequently dismissed the second issue
without prejudice.
The Rent Board demurred to Britton’s cross-complaint and moved for judgment
on the pleadings as to the complaint in intervention on the grounds that Rule 12.20 was a
valid exercise of the police power, that section 827 did not preempt Rule 12.20, and that
the Board did not exceed its powers when adopting Rule 12.20. The trial court granted
the Rent Board’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling it was entitled to a
declaration that that section 827 did not preempt Rule 12.20. It also sustained the Rent
Board’s demurrer to the cross-complaint’s causes of action concerning Rule 12.20.
The Rent Board and Britton then litigated the question of whether the Rent Board
had exceeded its powers when it enacted Rule 6.15C. The Rent Board moved for
judgment on the pleadings as to the cross-complaint on the grounds that Britton lacked
standing to challenge Rule 6.15C, subd. (3) and that the Rent Board did not exceed its
powers in adopting it. The trial court granted the motion with leave to amend to allege
standing. Britton amended the cross-complaint to allege that W.J. Britton & Co., Inc.
was an unincorporated association of landlords and owners of rental property, that it
managed and represented the rights of numerous landlords in San Francisco, and that it
brought suit in its representative capacity on behalf of its members to challenge the Rent
Board’s action. The Rent Board demurred to the amended cross-complaint on the ground
that it did not exceed its powers in adopted Rule 6:15C, subd. (3), but it did not argue that
Britton lacked standing to challenge the regulation. The trial court granted the demurrer
with leave to amend to allege facts showing Rule 6.15C, subd. (3) was not reasonably
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the Rent Ordinance and that it was arbitrary,
capricious, or without reasonable basis. Britton filed a second amended cross-complaint,
to which the Rent Board demurred, again on the sole ground that it did not exceed its
powers in enacting Rule 6.15C, subd. (3). The trial court granted the demurrer without