The fact that the receiver’s motion has been made in the context of a foreclosure action and denominated a motion for a writ of assistance, rather than in the form of a summary proceeding before the Civil Court, is irrelevant. We see nothing in section 235-b which reflects a legislative intent to limit its application to a particular forum or proceeding; nor are we aware of any statutory or policy barrier to the consideration of such a defense by Supreme Court in the context of a foreclosure proceeding, so long as all necessary parties are represented. Indeed, the court’s order appointing the receiver in the instant matter empowered him to "institute and carry on all legal proceedings necessary for the protection of the premises”, including "summary proceedings for the removal of any tenant or tenants or other persons” from the property. This language, apparently authorizing the receiver to commence summary eviction proceedings against unwelcome tenants in the Civil Court (where the warranty of habitability defense could be raised), dispositively addresses the claim that such collateral concerns are incompatible with the interests of speedy resolution of foreclosure proceedings. The fact that the receiver chose not to commence a separate proceeding, but instead sought a writ of assistance, does not relieve the Supreme Court of its judicial obligation to give the tenants a fair hearing on the habitability issue. As the receiver has noted in his brief, the order here appealed is an exercise of Supreme Court’s equitable authority and oversight over the receiver. In our view, one can hardly imagine a remedy less equitable than one which permits eviction of residential tenants under a lease without resolving facially valid claims of uninhabitability.