Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 318583.pub.pdf

Citation: Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 318583.pub.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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plaintiff need not show that retaliation was the only or "but for" cause of the adverse

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No. 31858-3-111
Sambas ivan v. Kadlec Med. Ctr.

employment action, but he or she must establish that it was at least a substantial factor.

Allison v. Housing Auth. o/City o/Seattle, 118 Wn.2d 79,85-96,821 P.2d 34 (1991).

In its second summary judgment motion, Kadlec argued that for purposes of his

state law claim, Dr. Sambasivan was required to demonstrate that Kadlec was his

employer, or, citing Marquis v. City o/Spokane, 130 Wn.2d 97, 112-13,922 P.2d 43

(1996), that he was in an independent contractor relationship by which he performed

personal services for Kadlec.

By its terms, RCW 49.60.210(1) broadly states that it is an unfair practice "for any

... person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because he

or she has opposed any practices forbidden by this chapter." (Emphasis added.) Two

published Washington decisions have read the retaliation provision more broadly than the

construction urged by Kadlec.

In 1997, the provision was held to apply to a former member ofa credit union who

was expelled as a member by the credit union's board after he provided a declaration

supporting an age- and gender-based discrimination lawsuit brought by credit union

employees. Galbraith v. TAPCD Credit Union, 88 Wn. App. 939, 946 P.2d 1242 (1997).

While recognizing that Washington cases interpreting the statute had generally involved

employee claims against employers, the Galbraith court identified several reasons for

construing it more broadly: first, RCW 49.60.21O's broad language that an unfair practice