who had made a whistleblower complaint against Hatcher, had “‘issues with his
timecard or accounting for his time’”; this court held that Hatcher’s action supported
a recall charge of witness intimidation “[w]hen viewed in the context of Sheriff
17
In re Recall of William O’Neil et al., No.105253-7
Hatcher’s pattern of threatening and retaliatory behavior” (quoting record)). Charge
13 clearly meets that test.
And while a media article is not “categorically” a sufficient basis for personal
knowledge of the facts required by law, West, 155 Wn.2d at 666 n.3, it is factually
sufficient here because (1) it gives the elected officials enough information to
respond to the charges, (2) it reports Myers’ firsthand belief that she was subject to
retaliation, and (3) the charge is supported by the context and supporting documents
of the petition as a whole. A voter could reasonably view Myers’ termination as part
of a pattern of retaliation.
B. Legal sufficiency
The legal sufficiency analysis for charge 13 is the same as for charge 12—
both allege retaliation. Charge 13 is legally sufficient because retaliation constitutes
malfeasance, misfeasance, or a violation of the oath of office. See pp. 14-16, above.
IV. The trial court correctly ruled that charge 7, alleging failure to disclose
material facts on a mandatory state reporting form, provides a factually
and legally sufficient basis to recall Keller
A. Factual sufficiency
Keller owns a hangar at the Richland Airport subject to a ground lease with
the Port. He owns that hangar through an LLC of which he is the sole member. CP
at 684-85 (Keller’s deed to the hangar), 701-17 (ground lease between Port and The
“Axe” LLC), 691-93 (showing Keller as the sole member of The “Axe” LLC). Keller