It will thus be seen that the plain purpose of the statute is that where condemnation is determined upon by the board, compensation must be made to the nonassenting property owner, • The order or resolution of the board condemning the property must, therefore, in such a case be followed by the institution of proceedings, to condemn, for it is the only method by which it can be (made effective. The property owner also has a pecuniary interest in the matter, which is sufficient to make the exercise of the power obligatory and enforeible at his suit. The permissive form in which the power is stated in the act is such as is commonly used in conferring jurisdiction, and does not mean that the board may or may not act' at its mere discretion. ■ Power thus conferred' becomes imperative when a .case is presented where either the public interests or the protection of a private right calls for its exercise. This is a well-settled principle of statutory construction. The statute then develops a perfectly clear and constitutional scheme for the abatement of nuisances of this class. The first step, is the order such as was ■ made in the first instance in this case. It is injunctive in form, and in contemplation of law suspends the occupation of the property while the grounds for’ complaint exist. The owner may remedy the evil, and when he shall have done so he will be relieved . from the order. Should this not be done or be impossible, the board may' follow up the first order by a second one,' whicb by statute is predicated upon the former, declaring the mischief irremediable and condemning the building. Where the owner does not assent to the removal, the board must avail itself of the remedy. • by which the condemnation is legally accomplished, and the amount of compensation to be