as an expression of legislative intent. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146
Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). A statute’s plain meaning may be discerned from “all
that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes.” Id. at 11. We look to the
language of a statute, the context in which the provision is found, related provisions, and
the statutory scheme as a whole. State v. Engel, 166 Wn.2d 572, 578, 210 P.3d 1007
(2009).
Knight advocates for a broad reading of § 9058(c)(1). In Knight’s view, the
conclusion that the CARES Act imposes a permanent, 30-day notice provision for all
evictions is simple. A landlord “may not require” a “tenant to vacate the covered
dwelling unit” until providing “30 days” of notice. 15 U.S.C. § 9058(c)(1). Echoing
Division Two in Asentista, Knight emphasizes that § 9058(c)(1) contains no language
“limiting its applicability to eviction[s] related to nonpayment of rent.” 29 Wn. App. 2d
at 523. Rather, the provision “broadly referred to any notice from the landlord to vacate,
7
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Hous. Auth. v. Knight, No. 102905-5
irrespective of the reason.” Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 10-11. Put another way, subsection
(c)(1) is silent as to the type of eviction triggering the 30-day notice requirement. The
Housing Authority, in contrast, urges that subsection (c)(1) must be read in conjunction
with subsection (c)(2), which refers back to subsection (b)(1)’s limitation to nonpayment
of rent.
We must interpret a statute’s terms “in the context . . . in which they appear, not in
isolation.” State v. Lilyblad, 163 Wn.2d 1, 9, 177 P.3d 686 (2008). We read statutory
provisions together and construe the statute as a whole. Hubbard v. Dep’t of Lab. &