Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 1012055.pdf

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of are either resulting in or will result in actual and substantial injury.’” Tyler Pipe

Indus., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 96 Wn.2d 785, 792, 638 P.2d 1213 (1982) (quoting

Port of Seattle v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 52 Wn.2d 317,

319, 324 P.2d 1099 (1958)).

The respondents argue the State can have no well-grounded fear of immediate

invasion of any right because the City has ceased enforcement of the CFRHP “unless

and until this litigation is resolved in its favor.” Resp’ts’ Br. at 78. But as the State

explains, “Voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case

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State v. City of Sunnyside et al.
No. 101205-5

because there is still a likelihood of the illegal conduct recurring.” State v. Ralph

Williams’ N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 82 Wn.2d 265, 272, 510 P.2d 233 (1973);

see Braam v. State, 150 Wn.2d 689, 709, 81 P.3d 851 (2003) (a plaintiff may pursue

injunctive relief unless it is “absolutely clear that behavior will not reoccur”). The

record and the respondents’ argument demonstrate that they would continue to

enforce the CFRHP in the same manner if not for this litigation and that they intend

to resume enforcement when this litigation is resolved. See 1 CP at 151. If the

respondents’ actions violate due process, the State has established that it has reason

to believe that injury will recur. The respondents have not shown they are entitled

to summary judgment on this basis.

V. Housing Discrimination

The respondents also sought summary judgment on the housing

discrimination claims, arguing the State cannot establish a prima facie case of

disparate impact because they have not demonstrated an adequate causal