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violations. Because termination from the program was mandatory on this ground, no
further explanation was required.
Assuming that the notice of decision is interpreted to uphold the termination based
solely on Johnson’s failure to timely notify the housing authority of her eviction, contrary
to Johnson’s argument, the decision comports with the requirements of due process.
Johnson is correct that a “hearing officer’s failure to make any findings, coupled with his
failure to indicate any awareness that he was explicitly authorized by HUD to exercise his
discretion to take into account relevant circumstances” is contrary to established law.
(Carter v. Lynn Hous. Auth. (Mass. 2008) 880 N.E.2d 778, 786-787.) Here, however, the
second paragraph of the decision quoted above demonstrates that the hearing officer was
aware of the housing authority’s discretion to excuse the violation but nonetheless chose
not to exercise that discretion in Johnson’s favor. As the hearing officer noted, Johnson
did not attempt to justify or excuse her failure to notify the housing authority of her
eviction. Nor did she offer any evidence or argument regarding mitigating circumstances.
Although the termination of services undoubtedly may result in a significant hardship for
Johnson, nothing in the record suggests that the hardship is significantly different from
the hardship that most other recipients of housing assistance suffer when their benefits
are terminated. Nothing in the record demonstrates that the hearing officer abused its
discretion in refusing to excuse the violation.
Accordingly, we must reverse the trial court’s order granting the petition for writ
of mandate.
Disposition
The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded with directions to enter
judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate.