4
their rental agreement was void, and plaintiff was barred from collecting any rent or using the
unlawful detainer procedures to enforce the collection of rent. (Gruzen, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d
at p. 518; Salazar v. Madareaga (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 4.) Put differently, if plaintiff
could not collect any rent from defendant, then defendant had no obligation to pay any rent to
plaintiff. Furthermore, if defendant did not owe any rent to plaintiff, the three-day notice
claiming $739.35 in past-due rent was necessarily an overstatement of defendant’s rental
obligation, which could only be properly calculated as zero. Since the three-day notice which
was the basis for this unlawful detainer action failed to comply with the strict statutory
requirements, it was invalid and could not support the action. (Levitz Furniture v. Wingtip
Communications, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1038.) The trial court therefore did not err in
finding that there was no triable issue of fact and in granting summary judgment to defendant.
Our conclusion is not altered by the decision in Gruzen on which plaintiff primarily
relies in asserting its unqualified right to a judgment for possession. In that case, the landlord
sought to evict a tenant from unpermitted premises based on a three-day notice to pay $600 in
back rent or quit. (Gruzen, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 519.) The landlord was awarded
possession of the premises and a money judgment. (Ibid.)
The sole issue on appeal, as characterized by the appellate court, was whether the rental
agreement was void due to the lack of a certificate of occupancy. (Gruzen, supra, 84
Cal.App.3d at p. 517.) After holding that the agreement was void under such circumstance, the
court modified the judgment by deleting the monetary award, but affirmed the judgment of
possession of the premises for the landlord. (Id. at p. 519.)
However, the court in Gruzen was never asked to decide — and did not decide — the
issue we address here, namely, whether the three-day notice alleging past-due rent of $739.35
was fatally defective because defendant’s actual rent obligation was zero, and whether
defendant was consequently entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. It is axiomatic
that an opinion is not authority for a proposition that was not considered in that appeal.
(Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1268; In re Noreen G. (2010) 181
Cal.App.4th 1359, 1377.) Because the issue on which our opinion turns was not raised in