6
II. DISCUSSION
Appellants challenge the order granting respondents’ anti-SLAPP motions,
focusing largely on what they contend was the trial court’s erroneous application of the
interim adverse judgment rule.4 Appellants did not appeal from the November 22 order
on the anti-SLAPP motions, however, but from the January 23 judgment that followed
later, which they relied on as the appealable order. Respondent Kruger contends that the
failure to timely appeal the anti-SLAPP order deprives this court of jurisdiction.
Appellants respond that their appeal from the January 23 judgment was proper under the
circumstances; but if this court concludes the appeal was untimely as to the anti-SLAPP
order, the appeal of the judgment and “orders relating thereto” was timely, enabling
appellate review of the denial of the motion for new trial. We find that appellants’
reliance on the timeliness of the appeal from the January 23 judgment is misplaced,
because it is predicated on the application of rule 8.108 to extend time for filing the
appeal. We conclude that rule 8.108 did not apply where the notice of motion for new
trial was not filed within the jurisdictional limit of 15 days from service of notice of entry
of the appealable order granting the anti-SLAPP motions.