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were entitled to judicial review of the board’s decision to grant or deny the certificate.
(Ibid.) The Supreme Court concluded, “[u]nlike the limitations . . . upon the grounds for
eviction, which can affect summary repossession proceedings only by making substantive
defenses available to the tenant, the requirement of a certificate of eviction raises
procedural barriers between the landlord and the judicial proceeding.” (Id. at p. 151.)
“The summary repossession procedure [citation] is intended to be a relatively simple and
speedy remedy that obviates any need for self-help by landlords. [Citations.] To require
landlords to fulfill the elaborate prerequisites for the issuance of a certificate of eviction
by the rent control board before they commence the statutory proceeding would nullify
the intended summary nature of the remedy.” (Ibid.)
Thus, under Birkenfeld, “municipalities may by ordinance limit the substantive
grounds for eviction by specifying that a landlord may gain possession of a rental unit
only on certain limited grounds. [Citations.] But they may not procedurally impair the
summary eviction scheme set forth in the unlawful detainer statutes . . . .” (Rental
Housing Assn. of Northern Alameda County v. City of Oakland (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th
741, 754 (Rental Housing).) The Property Owners argue the Ordinance is procedural
because it governs the timing of notices of eviction: “The Ordinance does not limit the
allowable justifications for evicting tenants; it only delays certain evictions.” Such
questions of timing, they contend, are purely procedural. The City argues the Ordinance
is substantive because timing is merely a component of the substantive defense to
eviction: “When the household to be evicted includes a child under the age of 18 or an
‘educator’ within the terms of the Ordinance, ‘good cause’ for a landlord to undertake
any of the specified types of no-fault evictions does not exist unless the eviction is to take
effect during the summer months.”
As this case illustrates, “the distinction between procedure and substantive law can
be ‘ “shadowy and difficult to draw” in practice.’ ” (Vaughn v. LJ Internat., Inc. (2009)