5
The undisputed evidence presented at trial established plaintiff’s noncompliance with
disclosure requirements. Defendant points out the rental agreement identified “SPM” as the
“Landlord” but did not identify or designate an owner or an agent who was authorized to act on
the owner’s behalf for service of process. The lease also did not disclose the “usual street
address” of such persons or entities, a valid telephone number, or the contact information for
any of the persons authorized to manage the premises.
Based on these omissions, defendant contends the trial court erred in finding plaintiff
complied with the requirements. We agree the evidence established a lack of strict compliance.
Nevertheless, as we explain below, based on our conclusion that subdivision (c) did not apply
to plaintiff, we affirm the judgment and the court’s denials of defendant’s motions. (Leyla v.
Crockett & Co., Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1105, 1108 [“‘We are not bound by the issues
actually decided by the trial court. “The appellate court should affirm the judgment of the trial
court if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case”’”].)
Ambiguity
Defendant contends that, under the statute, “if a new owner assumes a previously signed
lease agreement . . . that successor-owner must still provide . . . disclosures.” She does not
respond, however, to plaintiff’s argument that a new owner who does not assume the existing
lease, but instead executes a separate new lease with the tenant, is an owner and not a successor
owner for purposes of subdivision (c)’s bar against evictions.
The question then becomes whether plaintiff qualifies as a successor owner to which
subdivision (c) applies. Because section 1962 does not define “owner” or “successor owner,”
and it is silent as to whether a new owner who executes a separate new lease with the tenant is
an “owner,” there is a legitimate ambiguity in the statute.
After a property is sold or transferred, the transferee takes subject to the existing lease;
this new owner steps into the landlord’s shoes and becomes the successor landlord, assuming
the terms and conditions of the lease the tenant had with the prior owner. (See Kirk Corp. v.
First American Title Co. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 785, 809.) The same is true when the property
is sold through foreclosure, as was the case here. (See Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National