S.F. Apartment Assn. v. City & County of S.F. (2024)

Citation: S.F. Apartment Assn. v. City & County of S.F. (2024)
Parent Document: S.F. Apartment Assn. v. City & County of S.F. (2024)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2024-09-11
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10114513/sf-apartment-assn-v-city-county-of-sf/ ↗

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      The initiative thus imposed a cause basis for eviction, enumerating
various grounds for tenant fault similar to those already present in
San Francisco’s Rent Ordinance, including: nonpayment of rent, substantial
breach of tenancy after written notice to cease, substantial damage to
premises after written notice to cease, substantial disorderly conduct after
written notice to cease, and tenant refusal to allow landlord access to rental
unit after written notice to cease. (Rental Housing, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at
p. 762.) And like San Francisco’s Rent Ordinance before Ordinance No. 18-22
was passed, the provision authorizing eviction based on nonpayment of rent
did not require any supplemental notice beyond Code of Civil Procedure
section 1161.
      But the landlords argued that the notice requirements for the other
eviction grounds (breach of tenancy, damage, disorderly conduct, and refusal
of access) were preempted under Birkenfeld. (Rental Housing, supra, 171
Cal.App.4th at p. 762.) The appellate court disagreed, reasoning that the
notice requirements limited “a landlord’s right to initiate an eviction due to
certain tenant conduct by requiring that the specified conduct continue after
the landlord provides the tenant written notice to cease.” (Id. at pp. 762–
763.) Rental Housing thus concluded that the notice requirements “regulate
the substantive grounds for eviction, rather than the procedural remedy
available to the landlord once grounds for eviction have been established.”
(Id. at p. 763.)
      For the first time on appeal, the landlords also argued that the notice
provisions were “void for vagueness” because they did not “specify the time a
tenant must be provided to cure the violation before a landlord may
commence an eviction.” (Rental Housing, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 763 &
fn. 17.) The appellate court concluded that any “arguable vagueness” had

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