which has sometimes been relied upon as establishing the proposition that a building which was in a filthy condition and calculated to breed disease, and was thereby a public nuisance, might be torn down by way of abating the nuisance, was decided upon the facts of that case. It was there made to appear, and was not disputed, that the only way of abating the nuisance was by ■ the destruction of the buildings, and for that reason alone it was held by the Supreme Court that the destruction was justifiable. But in this case no such fact has been made to appear. Although the buildings may not have been capable of being fitted for habitation, still, if they were so put in repair that the e.vil smells should be removed and the sources of contagion taken away— as it is plain from the evidence might be done—the buildings would cease to be a nuisance, and the fact that they might not thereby be made fit for human habitation would not authorize their destruction. If they ceased to he in such a condition as to breed pestilence and spréad disease, and were rendered innoxious, the owner of them had a right to have them remain upon the premises,-even though he might uot be, permitted to use them as a tenement house. There are many other uses to which-he might lawfully put them, and the undoubted power of the public to refuse him permission to rent them to be used for human habitation did not ' necessarily involve the right to destroy them if they were not for that purpose.