Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 223 Cal. App. 4th 261 (2014)

Citation: Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 223 Cal. App. 4th 261 (2014)
Parent Document: Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 223 Cal. App. 4th 261 (2014)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2014-01-23
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2650742/nativi-v-deutsche-bank-national... ↗

Full Text

2,190 chars

20
operation of the Act. Congress struck a compromise by preserving bona fide leases for
the duration of their remaining terms while providing immediate successors in interest the
authority to "terminate a lease" "effective on the date of sale of the unit to a purchaser
who will occupy the unit as a primary residence" with the provision of at least 90-days
notice to vacate. (PTFA, § 702, subd. (a)(2).)
If section 702 of the PTFA were read as only requiring a 90-day notice to vacate,
much of its statutory language would be mere surplusage. Similarly, if that section were
read as applying only to leases that already survive foreclosure under state law, then the
Act's special protection for bona fide tenancies for a term would be rendered completely
superfluous. "The rules of statutory construction direct us to avoid, if possible,
interpretations that render a part of a statute surplusage. [Citations.]" (People v. Cole
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 980-981.) Courts "must strive to give meaning to every word in a
statute and to avoid constructions that render words, phrases, or clauses superfluous.
[Citations.]" (Klein v. U.S. (2006) 50 Cal.4th 68, 80.) The well-established principles of
statutory construction "preclude judicial construction that renders part of the statute
'meaningless or inoperative.' [Citation.]" (Hassan v. Mercy American River Hosp.
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 715-716.)
Although respondents insist that the PTFA provides nothing more than an
affirmative defense to judicial proceedings to oust a tenant from a foreclosed property,
we find no language in the Act suggesting such limitation. Moreover, their position
appears untenable when examined in the light of the PTFA's legislative history, the "evils
to be remedied," and administrative construction of the Act by federal entities. "The
object that a statute seeks to achieve is of primary importance in statutory interpretation.
[Citations.]" (Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry (1992) 1 Cal.4th 976, 987.) Congress
clearly intended the Act to put a stop to self-help measures like blocking bona fide
tenants' access, turning off their utilities, or removing the tenants' possessions. If this

Other Sections in This Document (81)

Full Text