The ease concedes that defendant declined to pay rent after abandoning the premises, but she paid all installments due up to the day of such abandonment. On this appearing conclusively, it is argued the verdict should have been for plaintiff and that the court erred in submitting the matter of an eviction to the jury, for, it is said, a mere breach on the part of a lessor of a covenant in the lease for repairs is not sufficient to operate an eviction but, instead, remits the lessee to his suit on the covenant for the breach. Generally speaking, the proposition may be conceded to be true, but it is wholly without influence here, for the eviction asserted relates to the breach of the covenant implied in the lease for quiet enjoyment and reckons with the covenant of the lessor to repair as an incident only. No one can doubt that the consideration of the lessee’s undertaking to pay rent is the quiet, peaceable and undisputed possession of the premises leased, and for this the lease implies a covenant on the part of the lessor which is in its nature a condition precedent to the payment of the rent reserved. Therefore, if the lessor, by any wrongful act, disturbs that possession, which he should protect and defend, he thereby forfeits his right, and the lessee may abandon the possession of the premises leased and thereby exonerate himself from liability to pay rent. Such is the doctrine of Jackson v. Eddy, 12 Mo. 209, which is frequently reaffirmed. An eviction may be either actual or constructive. An actual eviction exists when the lessor wrongfully enters upon the premises demised and by affirmative acts deprives the lessee of the beneficial use thereof, either in whole or in part. *668A constructive eviction may be found, even though no actual entry upon the premises is made by the lessor, when it appears that he, or one acting under his authority, does some act amounting to intentional, injurious interference by the landlord with the tenant’s possession and which deprives the tenant of the means or the power of beneficial enjoyment of the demised premises, or any part thereof, or materially impairs such beneficial enjoyment. A mere trespass on the part of the landlord will not suffice, but to constitute an eviction by construction of law, the wrongful conduct of the landlord must be sufficient, through affirmative act or omission of duty, to render the premises untenantable for the purpose for which the tenant leased them or at least seriously interferes with their permanent use. [See Delmar Investment Co. v. Blumenfield, 118 Mo. App. 308, 94 S. W. 823; Vromania Apartments Co. v. Goodman, 145 Mo. App. 653, 123 S. W. 543; 11 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), 471; McAdam (4 Ed.), 1381.]