On September 12, 1963, the return day of the order to show cause, the owner appeared by counsel and the mortgagee (who assertedly holds a mortgage for $20,000 as a nominal mortgagee for others) appeared in person. The court was advised that no one was then living in the building, that a number of the tenants who had been forced to vacate the premises intended to return as soon as the building was rendered safe and that the owmer had started to do the necessary work. In answer to a question put by the court as to the length of time required “to finish this job”, the owner’s attorney replied, “between two and three weeks at the most ”. Instead of adjourning the motion for 30 days, as the owner requested, the court granted the motion for the appointment of a receiver but “ stayed” his appointment until October 15 (a period of 33 days) to give the owner an “opportunity” to eliminate the violations and render the building habitable. The essential repairs not having been completed by that date, the owner was given further time, until November 20, to complete the task. And, when it appeared on this date that considerable work still remained to be done and that a number of serious violations still existed, the court signed the order appointing the receiver.
It is the appellants’ position (1) that the statute is unconstitutional in that it impairs the rights of appellant mortgagee under his prior mortgage contract (U. S. Const., art. I, § 10); (2) that they were denied a proper hearing; and (3) that, in any event, the facts failed to warrant the appointment of a receiver.